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I.

INTRODUCTION

"No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond
the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much
friction as the requests for documents for use in investigation and
litigation in the United States."1 United States trading partners have
2
objected to United States extraterritorial discovery since the 1800s.
Most of these objections result from the United States imposing its
substantive laws upon other countries against their will.3 Although

1.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 442 reporters' note 1 (1988).
2.

GARY

BORN

&

DAVID

WESTIN,

INTERNATIONAL

CIVIL LITIGATION

IN UNITED

278 n.68 (1989).
3. See Thomas S. Murley, Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of
Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 877, 877-88 nn.1 & 3 (1982) (providing an extensive catalogue of foreign blocking legislation
and United States cases compelling extraterritorial discovery).
STATES COURTS
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these objections often stem from national political and economic differences, they often manifest themselves in the first stages of litigation
4
- discovery of evidence.
Since the 1970s, Australia has been one of the most adamant objectors to United States extraterritorial discovery, "fishing expeditions,"
within its borders. 5 Given that Australia and the United States are
both common law jurisdictions born of the same mother country, why
all the squabbling over discovery? This note attempts to answer the
question by comparing Australian and United States discovery procedure, analyzing past disputes over extraterritorial discovery, analyzing
Australian "blocking" legislation and appraising past and future solutions to this troublesome issue of international litigation.

II.

AUSTRALIA AND UNITED STATES DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

A.

ExtraterritorialDiscovery "American Style"

A litigant in a United States proceeding has two methods of obtaining evidence located in another country. First, a party may conduct
direct discovery under Rules 33, 34, 36, and 45 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), provided the court has personal
jurisdiction over the party in control of the documents.6 Second, the
party may conduct indirect discovery by requesting cooperation of a
foreign judiciary in obtaining the documents. 7 What evidence a litigant
may obtain under either method is governed by two questions: "What
do you want, and why do you want it?"
Under the Federal Rules, a litigant can conduct extraterritorial
discovery against both parties and non-parties.' Discovery under Rules
33, 34, and 36 proceeds in the same manner as domestic discovery
and is enforceable under Rule 37.9 Production of documents from non-

4. See Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 794 (1984).
5. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on TransnationalDiscovery, 8 J. COMP. Bus.
& CAPITAL MKT. L. 419 (1986).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, 36, 45 (1989) [hereinafter Federal Rules]; see, e.g., In re

Sealed' Case, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1968).
7. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 305-09.
8. FED. R. CIv. P. 33, 34, 36 (parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (nonparties).
9. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 266-67. Federal Rule 37 sanctions for noncompliance with discovery requests include: 37(b)(1) contempt; 37(b)(2)(A) assumption of facts
against noncompliant party; 37(b)(2)(B) loss of claims or defenses; 37(b)(2)(C) dismissal of the
claim or default judgement; and 37(b)(2)(E) imposition of court costs and attorney fees. FED.

R. Civ. P. 37.
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parties may be conducted under Rule 45 through a subpoena duces
tecum with enforcement under Rule 37.10 However, if the court is
unable to effect service or does not have personal jurisdiction over
the person controlling the documents, it cannot enforce sanctions under
Rule 37 and will be limited to enforcing indirect discovery."
Indirect discovery is conducted through a "letter rogatory," which
is a formal request made by a domestic court to a foreign court for
assistance in performing a judicial act.12 Typically, the domestic court
will request that the foreign court compel a person within the foreign
court's jurisdiction to produce testimony or documents for use in the
domestic court's proceeding.' 3 In most cases the foreign court will
offer assistance, but it is under no obligation to do so. 14 Moreover,
even when the foreign court offers assistance, it will not likely be
willing to compel the type of broad, nonspecific discovery available in
United States courts.15 Foreign courts necessarily operate under their
own procedural law when obtaining discovery. Therefore, a domestic
litigant is limited to discovery which a litigant in the foreign court

10. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 267; see, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank,
699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
11. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 267. Indirect discovery is conducted through
letters rogatory. See also infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
12. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 306. Australia is not a member of the Hague
Evidence Convention. Member nations utilize a "letter of request" procedure analogous to the
customary letters rogatory used by non-member countries. As of September 1992, 16 nations
are signatories, including: Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (1988) (with declarations
by the signatories) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
13. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 306.
14. See id. A foreign court will often refuse to honor letters rogatory when doing so would
violate its country's laws or public policy, or would be contrary to the state's national interests.
See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.). There has
been much debate over whether the Hague Convention is binding upon the signatories. If so,
letters of request would be the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad, which would
radically change the texture of international litigation. See generally David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 521 (1988).
15. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 306. The United States has the most liberal discovery
laws of any nation. Other common law countries, in turn, generally allow more liberal discovery
than civil law countries. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 5; Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice
Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the
Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 733 (1983).
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could obtain.1 6 For these reasons, litigants normally utilize letters
rogatory only when the United States court lacks personal jurisdiction
to compel direct discovery.
When a United States court compels document production under
Federal Rule 37, it is exercising its enforcement jurisdiction. 17 If a
court has personal jurisdiction over a person, and that person has
control of documents requested by the court, the court may order the
person to produce the documents even though both the person and
the documents are located in a foreign state. 18 A court may also exercise "jurisdictional discovery," a limited form of personal jurisdiction,
to compel document production from a foreign entity in order to determine whether the entity is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
United States court.19 Whether a United States court should exercise
jurisdiction by compelling production of documents under Rule 37, and
whether the United States should sanction non-compliance, involves
sensitive comity considerations.20
More importantly, the scope of a United States court's authority
within a foreign jurisdiction is not solely for the United States judiciary
to decide. Cooperation from the foreign judiciary is the linchpin of
indirect discovery. Furthermore, there is potential for the foreign
party itself to enlist the foreign judiciary to block direct discovery by
United States courts. 2 Lastly, cooperation from the foreign judiciary
is necessary to enforce United States judgments against assets located
in the foreign country.

16.
17.

BORN & WESTIN,

supra note 2, at 307.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 6 (1965);
18.

BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 268.
See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. First Nat'l

City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-10 (2d Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT
LAWS § 53 (1971); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 268-69.

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

19. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982); In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983); Sealed Case, 832 F.2d at 1274; BORN & WESTIN, supra note 2, at 269.
20. Assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the subject of two restatements and countless
books and commentaries. For a catalogue of commentary related to discovery, see Mark Brodeur,
Note, Court Ordered Violations of Foreign Bank Secrecy and Blocking Laws: Solving the
ExtraterritorialDilemma, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 563, n.1.
21. The typical scenario is for the party to refuse to comply with a discovery request and
claim that compliance will subject it to civil and criminal penalties. See John M. Fedders et al.,
Waiver by Conduct - A Possible Response to the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets,
6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT. L. 1, 4-8 (1984).
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B.

Australian System

Australia is a commonwealth consisting of six states and two territories.- The Australian legal system is based on the English common
law,- and today Australia's substantive and procedural law roughly
parallels contemporary English law.? The Australian Commonwealth
however, is similar to the United States in that each state has its
own substantive and procedural law and the states together are gov25
erned by Commonwealth law.
Letters rogatory are used to enlist cooperation from Australian
courts in United States litigation.26 Based on respect for judicial and
international comity, Australian courts generally treat requests for
judicial assistance with sympathy and comply so far as principals of
Australian law permit. 27 Upon receipt of a letter rogatory, the Australian court initially must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the letter.- The subject matter jurisdiction of an
Australian court to compel discovery in Australia for use in a foreign
tribunal is based on nineteenth-century English legislation: the Foreign
Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856.2 Australian discovery procedure itself
is primarily governed by the law of the state or territory involved
rather than Commonwealth procedural law.3 o States are generally in
accord with regard to discovery law, and subtle differences are not
3
likely to bear significantly on foreign discovery requests. 1

22. Peter J. Perry, Australia, in OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN
BUSINESS DISPUTES 1 (Charles Platto ed., 1988). For a concise history of Australia from the
time of the first British influence in 1699 to the present, see WILLIAM WOODRUFF, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD: 1500 TO THE PRESENT 31-33, 177-79 (1991).
23. F.C. Hutley, Legal Traditions of Australia as Contrasted with Those of the United
States, 55 AUSTL. L.J. 63, 68-70 (1981) (commentary by an Australian judge).
24. Id.
25. See Perry, supra note 22, at 1.
26. See id.
27. See id.; In re Forsyth, [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 327, 334.
28. Forsyth, [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 334.
29. Id. at 330; see Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 113, § 1 (Eng.).
This legislation has been repealed in England but remains in effect in Australia. Perry, supra
note 22, at 2.
30. Perry, supra note 22, at 1. The law and procedure of New South Wales is substantially
similar to that of the other states. In New South Wales evidence taken for use in other tribunals
for use in criminal disputes is governed by the Extradition (Foreign States) Act 1966 (Commonwealth law), and the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act 1966 (Commonwealth law).
Evidence for use in civil business disputes in non-Commonwealth countries is governed by the
Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856. Id. at 1-2.
31. See id. at 1.
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In determining whether an Australian court has subject matter
jurisdiction, the foreign court must determine whether the information
requested is discoverable under Australian state discovery law.2 The
court will look to the subject matter of the request rather than the
precise wording of the request in determining what is reasonable.3
This determination requires the court to look at exactly what information is requested, why it is requested and "for what purpose" the
information will be used in the foreign proceeding.The Supreme Court of New South Wales has conducted the most
extensive analysis of letters rogatory to date. In In re Forsyth, the
Australian court considered letters rogatory issued by the Superior
Court of California.3 5 The California case was a very complex products
liability suit against several drug manufacturers.3 6 The defendants
sought information from an eminent Australian doctor regarding im7
portant research he had conducted on the drug involved in the suit
The California judge requested that the Australia court compel the
doctor to appear before an Australian commissioner in order to give
oral evidence and produce specified classes of documents.3 The court
determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction to compel production
39
but exercised its discretion not to compel production.
In determining subject matter jurisdiction, the Forsyth court considered the definition of "testimony" as it appears in section 1 of the
Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856. 40 This act grants jurisdiction
to Australian courts for the purpose of assisting in foreign proceedings. 4' The court followed the English Court of Appeal's interpretation
that the definition of "testimony" does not include broad discovery
requests not specifically intended to produce evidence for admission
at trial. 42 The Australian court examined the intended use of the re-

32. See id. at 1-2.
33. See id. at 3; Forsyth, [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 333.
34. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text (analysis of Forsyth).
35. [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 327, 329.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 328.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 334, 336.
40. Id. at 330.
41. Id.
42. Id. (following Radio Corp. of Am. (RCA) v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618. RCA
held that:
[1]t is plain that that principal (of discovery) has been carried very much further
in the United States of America than it has been carried in this country. ...
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quested evidence and determined that it would be used for a dual
purpose.- The primary purpose was for the discovery of other evidence, and the secondary purpose was for use at trial.- Although
Australia considers non-trial use of evidence illegitimate, the court
4
held that it had the necessary jurisdiction to compel production. 5
After establishing jurisdiction however, the court exercised its discretion and declined to compel the requested evidence.46 In reaching
this decision, the court weighed international comity considerations
against the court's procedural authority to compel discovery of an
expert witness.47 Having no Australian authority on point, the court
followed the English rule that courts generally may not compel. discovery of experts when they are not connected in some way to the litigation.- Additionally, the court noted that it would not compel disclosure
of the requested documents because they were oppressively volumin49
ous, and the court recommended narrowing the request.
In reaching its decision, the Forsyth court placed great weight on
its suspicion that the evidence was sought to obtain material to attack
the plaintiffs expert witnesses rather than for use as evidence at
trial.,- In fact, this "inappropriate" use appears to have persuaded the
court not to compel production. 1 Thus, Forsyth not only illustrates
Australian judicial analysis of United States letters rogatory, it illuminates the different procedural philosophies of the two countries.
C.

Comparison of Australian and United States Discovery

Although Australian and United States courts are siblings under
the English common law system, Australian discovery law differs significantly from United States discovery law. Australian discovery law
closely parallels the English system and yields a narrower, more

RCA,
43.
44.
means
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Testimony which is in the nature of proof for the purpose of trial is permissible.
Testimony, if it can be called 'testimony,' which is mere answers to questions on
the discovery proceeding designed to lead to a train of inquiry, is not permissible.
[1956] 1 Q.B. at 643-44, 646 (Devlin, L.J.).
Forsyth, [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 332.
Id. The court remarked that "the wide ranging nature of discovery in American courts
that in virtually every case there will be a dual purpose for seeking the evidence." Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. (following Seyfang v. G.D. Searle & Co., [1973] Q.B. 148, 152 (Cooke, L.J.)).
Id. at 337. The court awarded costs of the suit to the doctor as defendant. Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 332-33.
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tightly controlled factfinding process.5 2 The United States approach
to discovery is significantly more liberal than other common law jurisdictions and is codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The
Federal Rules are statutory and represent an important deviation
from older common law notions of discovery. Consequently, the liberal
scope of the Federal Rules has caused innumerable objections from
the international legal community.- Common law and civil law countries have universally objected to United States "fishing expeditions"
within their borders.The first of two major differences between Australian and United
States discovery involves the issue, "from whom can a party compel
discovery?" This question is crucial because a witness who cannot be
compelled in the domestic forum, cannot be compelled to provide evidence for use in a foreign proceeding.56 The decision to compel a
5
witness to give evidence is a matter of the domestic court's discretion. 7
Australian courts, following the English tradition, do not normally
allow discovery from non-parties. 5 While Federal Rule 26 does not
specify "whom" discovery may be taken from, Australian law requires
that discovery may be taken only from "any other party. 59 The tradi-

52.

See JULIUS B.

LEVINE, DISCOVERY:

A

COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMER-

ICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS

(1982); Hutley, supra note 23.

53. FED. R. CIV. P. 33, 34, 36, 37 and 45.
54. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434;
Societe Nationale Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987).
55. See Lowenfeld, supra note 5.
56. Perry, supra note 22, at 3.
57. See Forsyth, [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 334; In re State of Norway's Application, [1987]

1 Q.B. 433 (C.A.).
The exercise of discretion involves a balancing exercise between the desirable
policy of assisting foreign courts or tribunals against other relevant factors which
include the width of the request for testimony, the nature and importance of the
testimony, the ability of the foreign court to bring fresh proceedings in a more
limited and acceptable form, the health of the witnesses and the inconvenience to
the witnesses.
Perry, supra note 22, at 5.

58.

B.C.

CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE

349 (1985). This parallels the English

position in relation to United States discovery as explained in RCA by Lord Justice Devlin.
RCA, [1956] .1 Q.B. 618. Australia adopted the English position in Forsyth. Forsyth, [1984] 2
N.S.W.L.R. at 330-31. But see Nemeer Mukhtar, Enlarged Rights of Discovery Under New
Rules, 1987 L. INST. J. 722, 722-23 (indicating the current trend in South Australia and possibly
other states toward allowing discovery from nonparties and even strangers).
59. Radio Corp. of Am. (RCA) v. Reddingtons Rare Records, [1975] 1 All E.R. 38 (holding
the court cannot compel discovery from bystander or mere witness); see CAIRNS, supra note
58, at 340.
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tional English rule was that discovery could not be compelled of nonparties.- Several Australian states however, have modified this rule
and now allow limited discovery from non-parties. 1 The "party" rule
includes discovery from parties who are not technically party opponents as long as it involves a material issue disputed between them.62
Furthermore, joining parties for the purpose of discovery is considered
an abuse of process.The second major difference between the two systems regards
what a party may obtain through discovery. Procedurally, discovery
plays a different role in the Australian adjudicatory process than it
does in the United States.6 In the United States, discovery is designed
to ascertain the issues in order to frame them in the pleadings.- In
Australia, the issues are ascertained through the pleadings, and discovery is used primarily to resolve issues at trial.- Normally, discovery
is not even conducted until after the pleadings are closed.6 7 Because
discovery occurs at a different stage of the process, and is used for
different purposes, the scope of discoverable material is narrower in
Australian proceedings.
For example, Australian courts allow discovery of material which
will "throw light on the questions at issue."s This is much narrower
than Federal Rule 26 which allows discovery of information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 9 Australian courts reject this broad concept of discovery as merely "fish-

60. See CAIRNS, supra note 58.
61. Id. at 350. These states include the Northern Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Discovery of this type is called "limited discovery" and is separate and distinct from
general discovery. Id.
62. Birchall v. Birch Crispy & Co., [1913] 2 Ch. 375. Therefore, discovery may be compelled
from parties who are not technically adverse (the parties are on the same side of the "v.").
63. CAIRNS, supra note 58, at 350; see Wilson v. Church, [1879] 9 Ch. D. 552 (Cotton, L.J.).
64. See CAIRNS, supra note 58, at 370-71.
65. B.C. Cairns, An Evaluation of the Function and Practice of Discovery, 61 AUSTL.
L.J. 79, 84 (1987).
66. Id.
67. See Shane Simpson, Discovery Before Commencement of Proceedings, 54 AUSTL. L.J.
205 (1980). Two exceptions to this rule allow for "pre-trial" discovery: (1) where the defendant
is unknown, see Taylor v. Osborne, [1973] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 52 (personal injury caused by exploding
soft drink bottle), and (2) where the party lacks sufficient facts to file a claim, see Oswin v.
Radio 2UE (Sydney), Pty. Ltd., [1981] N.S.W.L.R. 246, 249.
68. See Donaldson v. Harris, (1973) 4 S.A.S.R. 299; Mulley v. Manifold, (1959) 103 C.L.R.
69.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

9

Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1992],
LAW Art. 7
INTERNATIONAL
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF

[Vol. 7

ing" for a cause of action and adopt a higher standard for relevancy.70
The Australian system, however, does not require information sought
through discovery to be admissible at trial. 7 ' The general rule is that
evidence stemming from reasonable inferences of matters in dispute
is relevant for discovery,72 but evidence that relates only to credibility
is not discoverable. 73 Australian courts, like United States courts,
shelter certain information from discovery under privileges such as
the attorney-client relationship, ' 4 self-incrimination75 and freedom from
76
unduly burdensome requests.
Philosophically, English and Australian views of the attorney's role
as factfinder are much narrower than the United States view. Under
the English common law system, the judge plays an active role in the
factfinding process. For example, a judge may cross-examine witnesses
from the bench.7 7 The power of the judge in these situations is called
judicial sovereignty.- Discovery request interference with judicial
sovereignty is less problematical in common law courts than in civil
law courts, but remains an issue in Australian proceedings.- 9
Although Australian judges show less deference to attorneys in
the adjudicatory process, they give much greater deference to international law and comity.- Australian courts seeking discovery from
parties in a foreign jurisdiction will generally not compel production
when doing so would expose the person to penalty under foreign law. s ,
Conversely, Australian judges expect foreign judges to render the
M

70. See W.A. Pines, Pty. Ltd. v. Bannerman, (1980) 30 A.L.R. 559; Associated Dominions
Assurance Soc'y, Pty. Ltd. v. John Fairfax & Sons, Pty. Ltd., (1952) 72 W.N. (N.S.W.) 250, 254.
71. Donaldson, (1973) 4 S.A.S.R. at 305.
72. CAIRNS, supra note 58, at 344.
73. George Balantine & Son, Ltd. v. F.E.R. Dixon & Son, Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1125.
74. See Brown v. The Queen, [1911] V.L.R. 410 (the Australia rule); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947) (the United States rule).
75. Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395, affd, Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.).
76. Australian courts call this abuse of process "oppression." See Alexander v. Fitzpatrick,
[1981] 1 Qd. R. 359; Attorney Gen. v. North Metro. Tramways Co., [1892] 3 Ch. 70. For the
United States position on unreasonably burdensome requests, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(a)(i).
77. See KEITH EVANS, ADVOCACY AT THE BAR: A BEGINNERS GUIDE 90-92 (1983).
78. See David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Arospatiale: The Quest for an
Analytical Framework, 82 A.J.I.L. 521, 536-37 (1988).
79. Differences in the role of the judge in United States courts and other common law
courts are often overlooked. Australian courts and judges generally possess more formal authority
than their American counterparts. Hutley, supra note 23, at 69-70.
80. See id. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 7.
81. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., [1978) A.C. 547 (H.L.).
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same degree of deference to international comity and Australian law.
Not having received this from the United States judiciary, Australian
courts appear reluctant to accommodate United States letters of request beyond minimal due process.

III.

IMPEDIMENTS TO OBTAINING DISCOVERY IN AUSTRALIA

A.

Antitrust Area

Since 1945, when the United States federal courts developed the
"effects" doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction, antitrust litigation
2
has been the most problematic area for extraterritorial discovery.
In fact, extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws
has provoked hostile reactions from virtually every major United
States trading partner. 3 Although these reactions primarily stem from
substantive disagreement over the proper role of antitrust laws, countries often respond on a procedural level by implementing "blocking
statutes" to frustrate extraterritorial discovery.Generally, blocking statutes serve as a front line of defense to
extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction by United States courts.8
Blocking discovery is a practical way to cripple and possibly deter
litigation under United States antitrust laws. The United States has
responded by implementing Federal Rule 37 sanctions such as default
judgments and heavy fines against non-complying parties. s6 This imposition of sanctions however, has only exacerbated the problem and has
in part provoked countries to implement the next level of defense:
judgment blocking statutes.8 7 Furthermore, in addition to these defensive tactics, Australia and several countries have implemented counteroffensive "claw back" and "cost recovery" statutes.- These extraordinary statutes enable a foreign corporation to attach the plaintiffs

82. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). For earlier development of the "effects" doctrine see Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
83. See Murley, supra note 3, at 877-78 nn.1 & 3.
84. See id. at 878 n.3.
85. Meessen, supra note 4, at 794.
86. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968).
87. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1984, No. 3, AUSTL. ACTS
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1038 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
88. Australia followed England's British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 in
implementing "claw back" provisions. See Philip K. Eure, Comment, Extraterritoriality:Australian Limitations on Foreign Judgments and Discovery, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 578 (1985).
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assets located in the foreign country in order to offset United States
judgments enforced against the defendant's assets in the United
States. s9
In the past twenty years, Australia and the United States have
disagreed significantly over the proper role and scope of antitrust
laws."0 Specifically, Australia has objected to the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws to Australian companies. 91 Although Australia's competition laws are based on United States competition laws, Australia has very different policy objectives. 92 On a
practical economic level, Australian industry strives to achieve substantial domestic size in order to take advantage of economies of scale.
On a policy level, Australia does not subscribe to the United States
position that antitrust laws are promulgated to encourage competition
and the "preservation of economic freedom of free enterprise." 93
Differences between Australian and United States antitrust policy
abruptly manifested themselves in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.9 In this case, Westinghouse Corporation brought a private antitrust suit against several foreign corporations, including four Australian corporations, for conspiring to fix the price of uranium in the
international market. 95 Westinghouse sought production of documents
located in Australia and the United States court issued letters rogatory
to Australian courts in order to enlist their assistance in obtaining the
documents.- In response, the Australian courts refused assistance and
the Australian Parliament quickly enacted the Foreign Proceedings
(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act of 1976. 97 The 1976 Act was the
first of several "blocking statutes" implemented by Australia to frustrate extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws.98

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. United States jurisdiction to enforce antitrust laws extraterritorially is derived from
the effects doctrine developed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945).
92. See Warren Pengilley, ExtraterritorialEffects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Legislation:A View from "Down Under", 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 837-38 (1983).
93. Id.
94. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). This case has been up and down the courts several
times. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
95. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
96. Id. at 1243.
97. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121, AUSTL.
ACTS 1125 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Act].
98. When it became apparent that blocking discovery was not sufficient to frustrate United
States antitrust enforcement, the Australian Parliament passed the Foreign Antitrust Judgments

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol7/iss1/7

12

EXTRA TERRITORIAL
DISCOin
VER
Y IN A USTRALIA
McDaniel: Extraterritorial
Discovery
Australia:
Fishing for Evidence "Do

On March 21, 1984, the Australian Parliament enacted the Foreign
Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act of 1984,- which incorporates
and supersedes the two previous Australian blocking statutes: the
1976 Act, and the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979.100 While the two previous blocking statutes
were passed in response to specific litigation, the new statute is one
of general applicability and reflects Australia's continued opposition
to the extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws.' 0'
In Uranium Antitrust, Australia had significant national economic
interests in protecting Australian companies from the reach of United
States antitrust laws.'-° This protectionist justification for blocking
discovery is the principal rationale for most blocking statutes. 0 3 Although considerations of sovereignty, international comity and international practice norms are significant, these justifications are secondary
to economic interests. Often, these justifications are proffered because
they are more palatable to the international community than "economic
protectionism." 0 4
The 1984 Act gives the Australian Attorney General power to block
discovery of evidence in three situations. First, the Attorney General
may block discovery if the Attorney General is satisfied that doing so
is "desirable for the protection of the national interest."105 "National
interest," as interpreted under the 1976 Act, roughly means "Australian economic interests. '106 Second, the Attorney General may block

(Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979, No. 13, AUSTL. ACTS (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
869 [hereinafter 1979 Act].
99. 1984 Act, supra note 87; see Eure, supra note 88. Also, the 1984 Act was originally
proposed in 1981 but enactment was postponed due to negotiation over the "Landmark Agreement" regarding United States-Australia antitrust cooperation. See Anthony J. Carroll, Comment, The ExtraterritorialEnforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation
in the United Kingdom and Australia, 13 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 377, 384-85 n.53 (1984).
100. See 1976 Act, supra note 97; 1979 Act, supra note 98; Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition
of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202, AUSTL. ACTS (1976) (renders acts of
Attorney General free from judicial review, although Parliament may disapprove any act within
15 days). The nonrecognition of judgments, "claw back," and "cost recovery" aspects of the 1984
Act are interesting but beyond the scope of this note. For further discussion of these provisions,
see Eure, supra note 88, at 582.
101. Eure, supra note 88, at 581 (citing transcripts of Australian Parliamentary debates).
At the time, the United States was extending the extraterritorial reach of its export control
laws. Id. at 581-82.
102. See Pengilley, supra note 92, at 873.
103. See, e.g., British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980.
104. But see id. Like the title of the Act, the British position is straightforward.
105. 1984 Act § 6(3).
106. See, e.g., Sen. Peter Durack, Q.C., Att'y Gen. of Austl., Australia: Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law, Address to the American Bar Ass'n (Aug. 12, 1981), in A.V.
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discovery if the Attorney General is satisfied that a foreign court is
exercising jurisdiction in violation of international law, comity or practice.10 This rationale is based on national sovereignty. Third, the Attorney General may block discovery if the Attorney General is satisfied
that proceedings (Australian) constituted by a foreign authority are
contrary to international law, comity or practice.1's
Under the 1984 Act the Attorney General may prohibit the following: production of documents located in Australia for use in a foreign
tribunal,' 0 9 an act in Australia intended to produce documents for a
foreign tribunal," 0 an act in Australia which is likely to produce information about documents located in Australia for use in a foreign tribunal,11 a citizen or resident of Australia who is before a foreign
tribunal from disclosing information about documents located in Australia" 2 and production of evidence in an Australian tribunal for the
purpose of a foreign tribunal."13 Individuals who violate the 1984 Act
are subject to a $50,000 Australian dollar fine or twelve months impris114
onment, and corporations may be fined $250,000 Australian dollars.
Thus, the 1984 Act clearly reflects Australia's fervent opposition to
extraterritorial discovery for use in United States antitrust actions.
B.

Banking/Securities Area

Nondisclosure or "secrecy" laws are another type of foreign legislation which often interferes with extraterritorial discovery. Secrecy
laws prevent financial institutions from disclosing the identity of bank
customers or information regarding customer accounts." 5 Disclosure
of such information may expose the financial institution to civil and

LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (1983). The Australian Attorney-General explained
that an adverse judgment, including treble damages, would adversely impact Australia's mineral
export industry.
107. 1984 Act § 6(4). "A bizarre spectacle occurred in England during the Uranium Antitrust
litigation in that a United States district court judge was present in the United Kingdom to
preside over the taking of evidence. Executives plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination on English Soil." Pengilley, supra note 92, at 875.
108. 1984 Act § 6(5).
109. Id. § 7(1)(a).
110. Id. § 7(1)(b)(i).
111. Id. § 7()(b)(ii).
112. Id. § 7(c).
113. Id. § 7(d).
114. Id. § 18(1)(a)-(b). Offenses under this Act are not indictable offenses and are punishable
on summary conviction. Id. § 18(2).
115. Brodeur, supra note 20, at 567.
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criminal prosecution. Thus, foreign parties often claim exposure to
secrecy laws as a predicate for noncompliance with extraterritorial
discovery orders.
Secrecy laws differ from blocking statutes both in origin and application. First, unlike blocking statutes, most countries' secrecy laws
developed from the concept of an individual's right of privacy in financial matters 116 and from the concept of a fiduciary "trust" between
banks and their customers.' 1 7 Several countries however, most notably
the Cayman Islands, have recently developed secrecy laws as a means
of attracting foreign capital.118 Second, many states have enacted secrecy laws in order to protect persecuted individuals from oppressive
or vindictive governments.'1 9 Although today these laws are sometimes
used to conceal fraud, such laws saved the French Huguenots from
religious persecution and German Jews from the Nazi war machine. 120
Third, unlike blocking statutes, secrecy laws apply to discovery by
domestic courts as well as foreign courts. 121 Lastly, because the rights
protected by secrecy laws are personal rather than national, they may
be waived explicitly or by conduct.Australia does not have an explicit banking secrecy law. Instead,
Australia derives its secrecy doctrine from a 1924 English case, Tournier v. National Provincial& Union Bank of England. - In Tournier,
the court recognized an individual's right of privacy or confidentiality
in financial records, based on the fiduciary relationship between banker
and client. - This right of confidentiality is contractual in nature,'
6
extends to all information obtained from the fiduciary relationship,12

116. Fedders et al., supra note 21, at 30 (describing secrecy laws from 16th century commercial banking law and secrecy laws in Roman and Germanic jurisprudence as aspects of the
right of privacy).
117. Id. at 31 (noting similar development in civil law countries including Switzerland,
Austria, and Germany).
118. See id. at 32.
119. Id. at 31.
120. See Pengilley, supra note 92, at 821; Fedders, supra note 21, at 31.
121. See Fedders et al., supra note 21, at 31.
122. See Pengilley, supra note 92, at 821; Brodeur, supra note 20, at 569.
123. [1923] 95 L.J.K.B. 449 (K.B.); see J. Walter & N. Erlich, Confidences - Bankers and
Custonwrs: Powers of Banks to Maintain Secrecy and Confidentiality, 63 AUSTL. L.J. 404
(1989). Most former colonies of the United Kingdom base their secrecy on Tournier. See Fedders,
et al. supra note 21, at 32. Hong Kong also bases its bank secrecy law on Tournier. See United
States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080, 1084-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
124. Tournier, 95 L.J.K.B. at 454.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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extends to all professional persons including accountants and doctors127
and continues after the relationship is terminated. '1
Since the right of confidentiality is a contractural right of the client,
however, not of the bank, 129 a court can compel disclosure from the
bank whenever it can compel disclosure from the client. 13 Thus, under
certain circumstances Australian courts have the power to subpoena
confidential information because the right of confidentiality is "subject
to, and overridden by the duty of any party. . . to comply with the
law of the land.' 131 Nevertheless, Australian courts have willingly extended broad secrecy protection to bank clients. See, e.g., Citibank
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation.132
The Australian Parliament, however, has adopted a different position regarding bank secrecy. The Cash Transactions Reporting Act of
198813 requires Australian financial institutions to automatically report
certain cash transactions in excess of $10,000 Australian dollars to a
federal agency.'3 In fact, the language of this statute imposes a greater
duty of disclosure on the bank than the analogous United States money
laundering statute. 135 This policy change significantly affects the entire
Australian banking industry, which has thrived partly because of Au136
stralia's strong banking secrecy laws.
The Australian government's new bank secrecy policy will likely
improve a litigant's chances of successfully obtaining bank records for
use in the United States. Increased disclosure in domestic proceedings
does not guarantee broader discovery will be afforded to foreign litigants, but it is encouraging. The Australian judiciary, however, exercises significant deference to the secrecy laws of other countries' 37 and

127. Parry-Jones v. Law Society, [1969] 1 Ch. 1 (C.A.); see Walter & Erlich, supra note
123, at 410.
128. Tournier, 95 L.J.K.B. at 454.
129. See Walter & Erlich, supra note 123, at 411.
130. Id.
131. Parry-Jones, [1969] 1 Ch. at 9; Walter & Erlich, supra note 123, at 411.
132. 1988 A.T.C. (CCH) 4714, the Federal Court of Australia upheld an injunction denying
Australian tax commission officials access to Citibank client information; see Walter & Erlich,C
supra note 123, at 412. Australia followed the English trend in Banker's Trust Co. v. Shapira,
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274.
133. Cash Transactions Reporting Act, 1988, No. 64 of 1988.
134. Walter & Erlich, supra note 123, at 412.
135. Money Laundering Control Act, 1986; Walter & Erlich, supra note 123, at 413-14.
136. See Walter & Erlich, supra note 123, at 412.
137. See, e.g., Adstream Bldg. Indus., Pty. Ltd. v. Queensland Cement & Lime Co., [1985]
1 Qd. R. 127 (no. 4); Ross Cranston, Banking Law, 63 AUSTL. L.J. 691, 691 (1989). But see
Medina v. Copenhagen Handelsbank Int'l, SA (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 19 Mar.
1989, G 171 of 1987), cited in Cranston, supra, at 691.
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likely will not be sympathetic to aggressive discovery requests by
38
United States courts.
These bank secrecy issues will be especially troublesome in SEC
investigations for several reasons. First, the SEC often asserts far39
reaching jurisdiction in conducting securities fraud investigations.
Second, the SEC's investigatory authority is administrative rather
than judicial, is "quite broad in scope"'' 4 and necessarily involves broad
discovery requests.14 1 Lastly, in addition to difficult confidentiality
problems Australian courts will not likely compel the broad type of
pre-trial discovery the SEC desires because Australian discovery procedure is much narrower than the discovery available under the Fed2
eral Rules. 14
IV.

A.

SOLUTIONS

"Landmark Agreement"

In an effort to quell increasing friction between Australia and the
United States over the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust
laws, the two countries signed the "Landmark Agreement" on United
States-Australia Antitrust Cooperation on June 29, 1982. 1 This bilateral agreement established a framework for resolving antitrust conflicts with greater respect for international comity and less infringement on national sovereignty. 1 Functionally, the Agreement centers

138. For an Australian view of the development of United States courts' treatment of
foreign secrecy laws, see Cranston, supra note 137, at 691-92.
139. See Daniel L. Goelzer & Anne Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International
Enforcement of the United States Securities Laws, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 145, 153-58 (1990).
Subject matter jurisdiction in law suits involving foreign transactions can be established using
the "conduct" test and the "effects" test. Id. at 147; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1986) (outlining bases of jurisdiction).
140. Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 139, at 152. In speaking on the administrative nature
of an analogous federal agency, the FTC, the Supreme Court said,
[This] power of inquisition ... is not derived from the judicial function. It is more
analogous to the [girand [j]ury, which does not depend on a case or controversy
to get evidence but can investigate on the mere suspicion that the law is being
violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 64243 (1950).
141. See Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 139, at 152.
142. See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rules).
143. See Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, the "Landmark Agreement," June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 702
(1982) [hereinafter Landmark Agreement].
144. James W. King, Note, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Efficacy of BilateralAgreements
in Resolving Disputes Between Sovereigns Arising from ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust
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around a detailed notification and consultation procedure. 145 Under this
procedure the United States "must" notify Australia of private antitrust actions involving Australian companies, and Australia "may"
notify the United States of changes in Australian policy which may
have antitrust implications for the United States.46 The process involves the government and the judiciary of both countries in an attempt to more effectively handle the sensitive foreign relations aspects
of antitrust cases.' 47 As a general rule, friendly governments will more
readily discuss national policies and interests amongst themselves than
allow these issues to be determined by the courts of a foreign country. 148

Regarding discovery, the Agreement embodies a compromise over
production of documents. 149 Upon proper notice, the Australian courts
agree to enforce compliance with United States requests for documents
on the condition that the information produced not be used as evidence
without consent.150 This compromise should improve the flow of information between parties by lessening the foreign party's incentive to
withhold documents. Although this may benefit the SEC and IRS in
conducting investigations, it does not appreciably benefit private litigants because the documents will be inadmissable as evidence without
consent. Ironically, by agreeing to help provide documents not to be
used as evidence, the Australian government subsidizes the United
States "fishing expeditions" it so detests.
Additionally, the escape clause of the Agreement allows Australia
to implement whatever actions are necessary to protect Australian
interests. 151 This means that when tensions rise, Australia "can always
fall back on blocking or, if necessary, 'clawback' legislation."52 FurtherLaw: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 52 (1983) (citing United
States Dep't of Justice, Comment to the United States-Australia Antitrust Agreement (press
release June 29, 1982)). This agreement was the product of four years of negotiation and was
signed by Peter Durack, the contemporaneous Australian Attorney-General.
145. See id. at 63.
146. See id. at 71. The mandatory language for the United States and permissive language
for Australia indicate the degree to which the United States was willing to compromise in order
to reach an agreement in this sensitive area. See Landmark Agreement art. 2(1); King, supra
note 144, at 71.
147. King, supra note 144, at 74-75.
148. J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United
States: A View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 211 (1978).
149. See Landmark Agreement art. 1, §§ 1-5.
150. See id., art. 3; King, supra note 144, at 73.
151. Landmark Agreement art. 4, § 2.
152. Landark Agreement of 29th June, 1982 Between Australia and the United States
on Antitrust Laws, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 507, 508 (1982) (explaining that the Landmark Agreement
is not binding on Australia).
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more, by passing the Excess of Jurisdiction Act in 1984, the Australian
parliament showed that the Landmark Agreement, in spite of its optimistic name, did little to quiet the continuing Australian apprehension
of United States extraterritorial action.
B.

Changes to the Federal Rules

The Federal Rules advisory committee has proposed amendments
to Rules 26 and 28 in an attempt to remedy problems associated with
conducting extraterritorial discovery.- These amendments imply
greater deference to international comity by encouraging indirect discovery of information located within a foreign jurisdiction.'- The prowhen indirect
posed amendments, however, allow for direct discovery
'
discovery methods "are inadequate or inequitable.1 55
As proposed, the amendments promulgate procedures to be used
only when a relevant treaty exists, such as the Hague Evidence Convention.156 Therefore, the new procedures may only be effective in
instances where a treaty on the procurement of evidence exists between the foreign country and the United States. 157 Although no such
treaty exists between Australia and the United States, many of the
policies behind the amendments apply in the absence of a formal treaty.
Apparently, the advisory committee was primarily concerned with
recognition of foreign national sovereignty and international comity.
Compelling the production of documents or the deposition of a witness
within the borders of a foreign country is "an awesome use of a nation's
coercive power - one that most Western democracies severely restrict
and frequently deny."1M Australia loudly voiced its sovereignty concerns in the UraniumAntitrust litigation, as did Canada and England,
but until recently these concerns have fallen on deaf ears in the United

153.

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-

ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULES], discussed in Joseph P. Griffin &
Mark N. Bravin, Beyond Aerospatiale: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery Provisions, 25
INT'L LAW. 331 (1991).
154. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 153, Rule 26(a); Griffin & Bravin, supra note 153,
at 341.
155. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 153, Rule 26(a). Arguably, this escape clause
eviscerates the rule because indirect discovery will almost never be "adequate or equitable"
relative to United States perceptions of discovery which are based on the extremely liberal
Federal Rules.
156. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 153, Rule 26(a).
157. See id. "Discovery at a place within a country having a treaty with the United States
" Id.
applicable to such discovery ..
158. See Oxman. supra note 15, at 739.
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States. Overall the preference in the new amendments for indirect
discovery signals a step towards greater international judicial cooperation, but may be viewed by the international community as falling
59
far short of a meaningful overture towards international comity.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Extraterritorial discovery is a troublesome but not unmanageable
aspect of international civil litigation. Difficulties in obtaining extraterritorial discovery in Australia illustrate two principal issues that underlie almost all extraterritorial discovery problems. First, procedural
law differences between countries create an inherent asymmetry of
discoverable evidence. 160 Parties should not expect extraterritorial discovery to yield the identical scope and volume of evidence available
in the United States under the Federal Rules.' 6' Second, the history
of legal foreign relations between countries, especially with regard to
past extraterritorial application of United States laws, bears significantly on the landscape of any transnational litigation.' 62 Australia's
extensive blocking legislation is testimony to bitter disagreement over
the extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws.
By recognizing differences between Australian and United States
discovery procedure and acknowledging the potential impact of Australian blocking legislation, a litigant will likely be more successful in
obtaining evidence located in Australia. A litigant pursuing direct
discovery should endeavor to do so as quietly as possible, in order to
avoid triggering blocking legislation. A litigant seeking indirect discovery should draft the letter rogatory as narrowly and specifically as
possible. The request should be couched in language suggesting that
the evidence requested is for use at trial, not for other evidentiary
purposes. Lastly, a litigant should always bear in mind that two bottom-line inquiries control extraterritorial discovery: "What do you
want, and why do you want it?"
Jerry L. McDaniel, III

159. See Gary Born, Fishing for Trouble in Foreign Depths, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991,
at 29. Cf. Thomas Reisenberg & Joseph Franco, New Procedures Cause a Ripple, Not a Wave,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at 29.
160. See generally Cairns, supra note 58; Levine, supra note 53.
161. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing Australian discovery).
162. See supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws).
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